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Natural Sciences,” Frege laments the tendency to confuse functions with objects and 
says, “It is here that the tendency of language by its use of the definite article to 
stamp as an object what is a function and hence a non-object, proves itself to be the 
source of inaccurate and misleading expressions and also of errors of thought. 
Probably most of the impurities that contaminate the logical source of knowledge 
have their origins in this.” This paper applies Frege’s logical insights to a series of 
influential modal arguments for the existence of souls or minds, in order to 
demonstrate that they hinge on the error of treating functions as objects. Related 
arguments have also resulted in the claim that identity statements are necessary, and 
that apparent identities “really” involve relations of constitution. Here it is argued that 
once we recognize that all these arguments involve the assimilation of objects and 
concepts (which Frege identifies with functions) they can be seen to be defective.  
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It is here that the tendency of language by its use of the definite 
article to stamp as an object what is a function and hence a non-
object, proves itself to be the source of inaccurate and misleading 
expressions and also of errors of thought. Probably most of the 
impurities that contaminate the logical source of knowledge have 
their origins in this.1 
 
From the perspective of the later Wittgenstein, philosophy is little more than 
a pathology, a confused search for ontological or metaphysical truths, fostered 
by misleading analogies inherent in natural language. There are many kinds 
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of language game, and Wittgenstein encourages us to resist a grammar that 
underlies “the idea that language always functions in one way.”2 One can 
surely have some sympathy with his suspicion of the misleading aspects of 
natural language, when it is applied to the case of Gottlob Frege, who had 
been at least partly responsible for luring the young Wittgenstein into 
philosophy. For Frege’s quest for an account of the foundations of arithmetic 
was stymied when he was misled by features of grammar into assuming that 
numbers are objects. Taking as reliable the way “three,” “one hundred,” and 
“forty-five” function in sentences, such as, “Three is prime” and “One 
hundred is greater than forty-five,” Frege became convinced that he needed 
to identify numbers with logical objects; for the expressions referring to them 
operate as singular terms.3 A direct consequence of this fatal assumption was 
the assimilation of numbers with the extensions of higher-order concepts, and 
the introduction into the Grundgesetze of the flawed comprehension principle, 
which mired it in paradox.4 At the end of his life, Frege lamented the illusory 
features of natural language, which had beguiled him into dedicating his life 
to a futile quest.5 
There is a rather bitter irony to this story. For, from the beginning of his 
career, Frege was fully aware of many of the misleading features of natural 
language. He developed his Begriffsschrift in order to be able to reason using 
a more precise linguistic tool, in which every inferential step would be clear. 
He distinguished use from mention. He suggested that the syntax of subject 
and predicate is logically misleading, and clearly differentiated the logical 
relation of an object falling under a concept, from that of the subordination 
of one concept to another. He distinguished the “is” of identity from the “is” 
of predication. He introduced quantification, and with it was able to avoid 
ambiguities in scope, in ways not available to earlier logicians. 
According to Frege, we think in language, but natural language is ambigu- 
ous and lacking in logical structure. One frequently occurring phenomenon, 
which leads to logical errors, is that the same word can be used, “to 
designate a concept and a single object which falls under that concept.”6 This 
feature of natural language is connected with the tendency not to distinguish 
instantiation, an object falling under a concept, from the subordination of one 
concept to another. Frege claims that the distinction between objects and 
concepts is logically primitive.7 There are objects, which he says, in somewhat 
metaphorical language, are able to stand on their own, and concepts, which 
are not able to stand on their own, but are only grasped as that which we 
recognize to be shared or otherwise, by objects, in thinking about what is 
either true or false of them. In his mature logic, developed in Grundgesetze, 
concepts are identified with functions from objects to truth values. In a well 
constructed logical language, expressions that indicate objects – singular 
terms – are to be carefully distinguished from those that pick out concepts – 
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predicates. The first are complete, the second have gaps that need to be com- 
pleted with singular terms, or with quantifiers – concepts that take concepts 
as values. Frege’s symbolic language, which he describes as a visual symbol 
system in which logical relations are represented through the use of the two 
dimensional features of the writing surface, attempts to conform to this 
demand.8 But the moral that we should draw from Frege’s ultimate failure, is 
that not even a carefully constructed formal language can be guaranteed to 
prevent us from confusing objects and concepts. A whole raft of bad 
arguments, which continue to plague philosophers, trade on this confusion, 
and the failure of Frege’s logicist project is, arguably, also the result of his 
not having maintained this logical distinction sufficiently clearly.  
Here I analyze four famous arguments, which I argue, are fallacious 
because they confuse object and concept. The first is Plato’s argument in the 
Phaedo that the soul is immortal.9 The second Descartes’s modal argument 
for the distinctness of mind and body, the third is Kripke’s more recent 
version of Descartes’s argument, which is dependent on his case for the 
necessity of identity. The last is the closely connected argument for dis- 
tinguishing identity and constitution. The fallacy in each of these can easily 
be seen when one follows Frege’s injunction not to confuse the ontological 
categories of object and concept, and formalizes them in the language of 
predicate logic. These fallacious arguments ultimately illustrate, in a striking 
way, how much modal ontology is illusory – spawned by misleading gram- 
matical features of natural language. 
 
1. Plato on the Immortality of the Soul (Phaedo 102d–107a) 
 
The last of the arguments for the immortality of the soul offered by Plato in 
the Phaedo can be spelt out in the following way: 
 
A) Nothing can become its opposite while still being itself. 
B) This is true not only of opposites but of things that contain opposites. 
C) The soul always brings life with it. 
D) Therefore the soul will never admit the opposite of life, that is death. 
E) What does not admit death is indestructible.10 
Therefore: the soul is indestructible. 
 
As soon as we translate these premises into a language that carefully 
distinguishes objects from concepts, and instantiation from subordination, its 
invalidity is manifest. A is ambiguous. On one reading it says that there is 
nothing that can change from falling under a concept to falling under the 
opposite concept. But this is clearly false. Many things can change from 
being hot to cold, short to tall, living to dead. Alternatively it says that 
nothing can fall under a concept and its opposite, at the same time. Taking 
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“not P” to be the opposite of “P” (purists should read the quote marks here as 
quasi-quotes), we have the true: 
 
A’)  x (Px & Px). 
 
Or we could render this modally as, 
 
A’’) x (Px & Px). 
 
This translates, “Nothing can become its opposite while still being what it is” 
as, “It is not possible for anything to be what it is and its opposite” which is 
less ambiguous and true, so long as we assume an implicit, “at the same time.” 
The next premise, B is a classic case in which natural language refers 
ambiguously to objects and concepts. It is clear that what Plato intends to 
say is that if, for instance, being three “contains” being prime, then it is not 
just the case that being three excludes being not three, but that being three 
also excludes being not prime. “Containment” is clearly subordination, not 
instantiation, though the phrase, “things that contain opposites” invites us to 
treat the concept as itself an object. We can formalize what is true in Plato’s 
observation thus: 
 
B’) x ((Px  Qx)  (Px & Qx)). 
 
Which can be rendered with a modal emphasis, 
 
B’’) x ((Px  Qx)  (Px & Qx)). 
 
The situation in which the concept of being P is subordinate to the concept 
of being Q, can be represented as it’s being true of everything that, if it is 
necessary that if it is P then it is Q, this implies that, it is not possible that 
something should be P and not Q. I am using  and  here, in a naïve way, 
which is not intended to imply any commitment to possible world semantics. 
The next premise, “The soul always brings life with it” also fails to observe 
the distinction between object and concept. Perhaps “the soul” refers to an 
object. But then we will have to interpret it as saying that the soul is always 
living, in which case the argument simply assumes the conclusion to be 
proved. So, charitably we should interpret it as saying that anything that has 
a soul is alive: 
 
C’) x (x has a soul   x is alive). 
 
An advantage of this is that D’ follows from B’ and C’ giving: 
 
D’)  x (x has a soul & x is alive). 
 
But of course, this is not what D says. What Plato wants to conclude is 
 
D’’) x (x is a soul   x is alive). 
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Which renders, “The soul is necessarily alive.” How might Plato have 
thought that he could deduce this? From B’’ and (x has a soul  x is alive) 
he might have deduced, 
 
D’’’) x (x has a soul & x is alive). 
 
But the fact that instantiating the concept of having a soul excludes instan- 
tiating the concept of not being alive, fails to imply that there is something 
that is necessarily alive. By Plato’s definitions, it is impossible to have a soul 
and not to be alive. This might lead one to conclude that humans don’t have 
souls, since humans are not necessarily living. Plato, however, was probably 
thinking of the soul as something the possession of which is sufficient for 
being alive. When humans instantiate the concept of having a soul they are 
necessarily alive. But natural language encourages us to speak of the concept 
of having a soul as implying the existence of an object had, and then to say 
of “it” that it is necessarily alive. 
Actually, there are two fallacious steps in Plato’s argument as I have 
formulated it. To get from D’) to D’’) he has to move from, x has a soul, to, 
x is a soul. Presumably he reasons that the soul, being that thing which, when 
possessed, brings life with it, then it, the soul, is necessarily living. But of 
course this is a fallacy. Suppose that there is a diamond ring that necessarily 
brings wealth with it, it is not possible to have this ring and not be wealthy. 
We cannot conclude that the ring is necessarily wealthy. The ring, which 
brings wealth to its possessor is not even the sort of thing to which it makes 
sense to attribute wealth. Similarly, the soul, which brings life to its possessor, 
may not be the sort of thing to which it makes sense to attribute life. But even 
if we were to find some way to allow him to deduce D’’) which says that if 
anything is a soul then it is necessarily alive, this still would not justify him 
in assuming that there exists something which is a soul and necessarily alive. 
Plato’s fallacy depends on moving from a relation of subordination, 
which is claimed to hold between the concepts of having a soul and being 
alive, to the claim that there is an object which instantiates the property of 
necessarily being alive. We might think that this fallacy is pretty obvious, 
and of at best historical interest. Yet I suggest that it is a perennial of modern 
as well as contemporary philosophers and modal logicians. 
 
2. Descartes on the Distinctness of Mind and Body  
 
In the Meditations Descartes argues that the mind and the body are distinct 
because he can conceive of himself existing without a body, while he cannot 
conceive of himself existing without a mind. His response to Arnaud’s 
objection to this claim includes the following short version of the argument 
for the distinctness of the mind and the body: 
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Hence it was that those additional attributes [being united to a 
body] were judged not to belong to the essence of the mind. For in 
my opinion nothing without which a thing can still exist is com- 
prised in its essence, and although mind belongs to the essence of 
man, to be united to a human body is in the proper sense no part of 
the essence of mind.11 
 
Informally, Descartes is arguing that he has a mind, and the additional 
attribute of being united to a body is not part of the essence of mind. For, 
mind is part of the essence of man, while to be united to a human body is not 
part of the essence of mind. If something can exist without something, then 
the latter is not part of the essence of the first. 
Translating this argument into a language which respects the distinction 
between concept and object presents some difficulties, since it is not imme- 
diately clear how talk of essence translates into talk of concepts and objects. 
The essence of a thing is usually taken to consist in those properties without 
which a thing would not be a thing of the kind it is. So, the essence of 
humanity consists in the properties that a thing must have in order to fall 
under the concept of being human. The essence of mentality consists in the 
properties a thing must have in order to fall under the concept of either 
having or being a mind. Frege called these the marks of a concept. Taking 
this as our guide, we can translate Descartes’ major premise,  
 
F) If something can exist without something, then the latter is not part of the 
essence of the first as, 
 
F’) x (Px & (Px & Qx))   x(Px  Qx). 
 
It is now easy enough to formalize,  
 




H) Being united to a human body is no part of the essence of mind 
 




H’) x (x is has a mind  x has a human body). 
 
This says that some things may have minds which don’t have human bodies, 
and indeed, there may be non-human thinking things, gods, angels, dolphins, 
apes, or maybe even computers. This might be equally formulated, 
 
H’’)  x (x is has a mind  x has a human body). 
 
But this does not show that,  
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I) It is possible that something could have a mind and not have any kind of 
body. For that we would need, 
 
I’) x (x has a mind &  x has a body). 
 
Charitably one could object that the qualifier “human” is a distraction. Really 
Descartes indented to assert,  
 
H’’’)  x (x is has a mind  x has a body). 
 
Then Descartes may have intended us to affirm the consequent and derive 
from H’’’ and F’ 
 
I’’) x (x has a mind & (x has a mind & x has a body)). 
 
This would indeed make I’) true, but only at the cost of an obvious fallacy. 
To see this, take the case of its being essential to being a functioning airplane 
that it has wings, and not essential to a thing’s having wings that it has an 
engine. We can’t deduce from, it is not necessary that if a thing has wings, it 
has an engine, the conclusion that there is a functioning airplane and 
possibly it is a functioning airplane and does not have an engine.  
More charitably, Descartes intends us to infer from G, and the truth of its 
instance, “Descartes is human,” to Descartes has a mind. Descartes also 
has a body and believes that it is not essential to his having a mind that he 
has a body. So, there is something, Descartes, which has a mind essentially, 
and which does not have a body essentially, 
 
J) x (x has a mind & x has a body). 
 
This is enough to convince us that having a mind is not the same concept as 
having a body. It might be essential to being human that one has a mind, and 
it might not be essential to having a mind that one has a body. Equally it 
might be essential to being Descartes that he is a man, and not essential to 
his being a man that he wears a hat. But this does not imply that Descartes, 
the man, is a different object to Descartes, the hat wearer. Nor should we 
take J) to imply that the thing that has a mind is a different object to the thing 
that has a body. So J) does not imply that there is an ordinary object, the 
mind, which is a different ordinary object to the body. 
What does follow, if having a mind is essential to being a man, while 
having a body is not, is that Descartes could continue to exist as a man 
without his body. Those who are materialists will doubt that this is the case. 
What does not follow is that there must have been two different objects here 
all along, the man, who had a mind essentially, and the body, which did not 
have a mind essentially. Or, if we do think that this is implied, we will have 
to say that in the case of Descartes and his hat there were also two different 
objects here all along, Descartes, who has the property of being a man 
essentially, and the hat wearer who does not have the property of being a 
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man essentially. Whenever we have an object that falls under a concept, 
which is subordinate to another concept, which is not subordinate to a third, 
Descartes’ inference would entail that there are in fact multiple objects. As we 
shall see, this is a bullet well bitten by those who believe in the distinction 
between identity and constitution. 
 
3. Kripke on Mind Brain Identity 
 
Kripke endorses Descartes argument, rendering it, “a person or mind is 
distinct from his body, since the mind could exist without the body.”12 He 
offers a version of Descartes’ argument that has a rather different form to the 
one above and is a reductio ad absurdum,  
 
K) Descartes = Body   (Descartes = Body). 
 
L)  (Descartes = Body). 
 
Therefore (Descartes = Body).13 
 
In this argument “Descartes” and “Body” are taken to be rigid designators. 
L) is taken to be false because it is conceivable that Descartes could have 
existed without his body. A good deal of the contemporary discussion of 
Kripke’s argument has focused on whether the inference from, “it is con- 
ceivable that not p” to “it is not necessary that p” is sound.14 Here we can 
bypass this worry. In the previous section we cast doubt on the cogency of 
Descartes’ argument. Kripke’s formulation suggests a slightly different but 
related line of attack. If Descartes and Body are identical and if it is essential 
to Body, that Body has a body then the claim, “ Descartes has a mind 
&  Descartes has a body,” from which Descartes wants us to derive J) 
will be false. Kripke thinks that this poses a problem for the identity theorist, 
who wants to claim that the identity between say, the mind and the brain, or 
pain and C-fibers firing, is contingent. But, I shall argue, even if it turns out 
that Descartes was wrong, and his having a body is just as necessary for his 
continued existence as is his having a mind, this fact does not imply that the 
careful identity theorist is committed to treating minds as objects that are 
identical with brains.  
Kripke poses a dilemma for the identity theorist, based on an argument for 
the necessity of identity. Either the person, or mind, is distinct from the body 
(or brain), or the mind and the brain are necessarily identical. Few people 
think that the mind is necessarily identical with the body (or brain), so the 
mind must be distinct from the body (or brain). But beneath this simple and 
apparently unassailable piece of reasoning there lie murky depths, which are 
revealed when we ask a few questions. Let us begin with the relation of 
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identity. Kripke offers an argument for the necessity of identity along the 
following lines: 
 
M) a = a  (a = a) (Everything is necessarily self-identical). 
 
N) a = b  (a = b) (from M and Leibniz law).  
 
Let me first say that there is something very odd about this argument, if we 
think of it as formulated in a logically perfect language.15 For, in such a lan- 
guage, we would not allow there to be different names for the same object. 
Any sentence of the form a=b would, by definition, be false. So Kripke must 
be assuming that he is talking about natural language, in which distinct 
names can turn out to pick out the same object. Frege, for whom this was a 
problem, concluded that in such cases the names (or singular terms) must be 
associated with different “ways of being given” the object in question, and 
called such “ways of being given the objects” senses, thus enriching his 
ontology, so that it included not just objects and concepts (the referents of 
singular terms and predicative expressions, respectively) but also the senses 
of singular terms and predicative expressions.16 So, one might respond to 
Kripke’s argument by deploying the notion of sense, by observing that  
introduces an opaque context, and by arguing that the assumption that, when 
there are distinct names for an object, they can be intersubstituted for each 
other salvae veritate in an opaque context, begs the question against those who 
believe that identity statements, involving distinct names, are not necessarily 
true.17 
I do not want to take this more traditional path, however, for it is not 
necessary to introduce the distinction between sense and reference, in order 
to show that beneath Kripke’s formulations there is a strand of reasoning 
remarkably similar to the fallacious argumentation that we discovered in 
Plato, which depends on conflating objects and concepts. Plato might well 
have formulated C’ as  
 
C’’) x (x has a soul    x is alive). 
 
He read this as implying that if something is a soul, it is necessarily alive, 
and from this he wished to derive, 
 
D’’’)  x (x is a soul &  x is alive). 
 
He felt entitled to use the definite article in order to refer to the soul and say 
of it that it is necessarily living. Kripke’s argument for the necessity of iden- 
tity has the same form. Being necessarily identical with itself is a concept. It 
is a concept under which every existing thing falls. So we have: 
 
O) x (x is an existing object    x=x). 
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In order to apply Leibniz law and derive N from M we have to assume that 
O entitles us to derive 
 
P)  x (x is an existing object &  x = x). 
 
Some object exists and is not possibly not identical with itself. We can now 
refer to this thing, whatever it is as, the object, and say of it that it is neces- 
sarily self-identical. We take, if anything is an object then it is necessarily 
self-identical, to entitle us to talk about the object and say of it that it is 
necessarily self-identical in a manner that is analogous to Plato’s transition 
from, if anything is a soul then it is necessarily living to, the soul is neces- 
sarily living. Since this assumption entitles us to derive N from M we should 
conclude that Kripke’s new argument against mind brain identity falls back 
on one element of the fallacious reasoning in Plato’s argument for the immor- 
tality of the soul. 
For those who are convinced by Kripke’s arguments for the necessity of 
identity, the previous arguments might, nevertheless, be taken to be a rescue 
of Plato, rather than a refutation of Kripke, so it seems worthwhile offering 
further evidence that Kripke’s argument plays fast and loose with the dis- 
tinction between concepts and objects. We can see this by asking what terms 
like “the mind” and “the brain” actually refer to. These expressions look like 
definite descriptions. But clearly, we are not here dealing with classic 
definite descriptions as analyzed by Russell. We are not saying that there is a 
unique mind and it is identical with something which is the unique brain. We 
would be saying something of this kind, were we to say “The Queen of 
England is the Head of the Anglican Church.” But clearly, this is not what 
we are saying when we say the mind is the brain. 
Indeed, it is not at all clear that “The mind is the brain” is an identity 
statement at all. Not, that is, if we think of identity as a relation that only holds 
for objects.18 If we say “The end of life is the cessation of brain activity” or 
“Happiness is the reward of virtue” we are asserting a connection between a 
person’s coming to the end of life and the cessation of their brain activity, or 
between a person’s being happy and their being virtuous. We are asserting 
that a relationship holds between concepts. “The mind is the brain” is similar. 
It is short hand for something like, “Something has a mind if and only if it 
has a functioning brain of a certain kind.” 
Frege, whose insistence on distinguishing objects and concepts has been 
the guiding thread for the argument of this paper, insisted that identity does 
not hold for concepts, which, in a logically well-formed language will be 
referred to by unsaturated expressions such as “…is a mind” or “… is a brain.” 
Nevertheless he thought that complete co-extensiveness is the analogue of 
identity for concepts.19 We can adapt his notation for the extensions – or the 
courses of values – of concepts, to conform with the limitations of current 
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soft-ware, by replacing his Greek letters with roman ones, and formulate the 
analogue of identity for concepts thus: 
 
Q) êf(e) = âg(a) = x (fx = gx). 
 
Where êf(e) is a term for the extension of the concept f and âg(a) a term for 
the extension of the concept g. Following Frege’s understanding of the 
meaning of his formula language, Q says, that “the extension (course of 
values) of f is the same object as the extension (course of values) of g,” has 
the same truth value as, “the truth value of, x’s falling under the concept f is 
identical with the truth value of x’s falling under the concept g.” Since it is 
rather plausible to read the ordinary language expression “the mind” as a way 
of talking about the concept of having a mind, and similarly for “the brain,” 
a careful formulation of, “the mind is the brain” might appear to be: 
 
R) ê is a mind(e) = â is a brain(a). 
 
Here we face a slippage similar to that we noticed in Plato. Clearly, since 
there are dead, unthinking brains, the concept of being a mind is quite 
different from the concept of being a brain, and R) is false. What we are 
interested in is the relationship between the concept of having a mind, and 
having a functioning brain of a certain kind. We need, 
 
R’) ê has a mind(e) = â has a brain(a). 
 
Where “has a brain” is short for having a functioning brain of the appropriate 
kind. This does allow us to formulate “the mind is the brain” as an identity. 
But it is an identity of extensions, or courses of values, and whatever one 
thinks about the identity of objects, it is simply counterintuitive to say that if 
extensions are identical then they are necessarily identical. What is true is 
that if x (fx = gx) then (êf(e) = âg(a)). However, the correlate of K 
 
K’) ê has a mind (e) = â has a brain (a)  x(x has a mind = x has a brain). 
 
is a complete non-starter as a valid claim. There is no reason to think that if 
identical, the extensions of these two very different concepts are necessarily 
identical. One might try the following, 
 
M’) êf(e) = êf(e)  (êf(e) = êf(e)) (From, everything, including extensions, 
is necessarily self identical). 
 
N’) êf(e) = âg(a)  (êf(e) = âg(a)) (from M’ by Leibniz’s law). 
 
But this would show that any pair of co-extensive concepts is necessarily co-
extensive, surely an intolerable result. This suggests that either extensions are 
not objects, or we need a restriction on Leibniz’s law, or perhaps that Frege’s 
courses of values are not extensions in the ordinary sense. Alternatively, it 
might be objected that expressions such as êf(e) are not rigid designators. 
Yet, doing this would immediately rob Kripke’s argument of any validity. 
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Kripke’s argument was plausible if we thought of names as rigid designators, 
that is, as singular terms that pick out the same object in every possible 
world. If expressions such as “the mind” and “the brain” are not rigid 
designators, the argument does not get off the ground. If it is not possible to 
formulate singular terms that rigidly designate the mind and the brain, then 
we can’t even express the necessity of their identity. At the very least, this 
shows that for Kripke’s argument to succeed he needs to show how we can 
formulate such rigid designators. 
In fact, if one believes that having a mind is simply having a functioning 
brain of the appropriate kind, then it will not be possible for something to 
exist with a mind without its having an appropriately functioning brain. It 
may turn out that these are just two ways of referring to the same concept, 
thought of as a function from objects to truth values, but we don’t immediately 
recognize this because these concept expressions have different senses. In such 
a case it might not to be possible for something to fall within the extension 
of, “… has a mind” without falling within the extension of “… has a brain,” 
so one might accept that x ( x has a mind = x has a brain) and hence that, 
(ê has a mind (e) = â has a brain (a)). Alternatively, if one thinks that some 
computers may well be deemed to have minds, one will want to deny that it 
is necessary that anything that has a mind has a brain. But, even if one were 
to accept that the extensions of these concepts are necessarily identical, this 
would not show that there is an ordinary kind of object referred to by “the 
mind” which is necessarily identical to whatever is referred to by “the brain,” 
if minds are brains.  
 
4. The Distinction between Identity and Constitution 
 
It should by now be becoming clear that the argument for the distinction 
between identity and constitution is grounded on an inference which suffers 
from a similar defect to that identified in the argument against mind brain 
identity. Indeed, a footnote in Naming and Necessity lies at the origin con- 
temporary discussions of the distinction, and in one version the argument has 
the same form as Kripke’s argument against mind brain identity.20 Take a 
statue and the marble out of which it is made. 
 
K’’) The statue = the marble  (The statue = the marble). 
 
L’’)  (The statue = the marble). 
 
Therefore the statue is not identical with the marble from which it is made. 
 
Alternatively, one can see the argument as being closer to Plato’s original. It 
is often said informally that it is not possible for the statue to continue to 
exist and not be a statue, while it is possible for the marble to continue to 
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exist and not be a statue. Therefore, the statue and the marble have different 
modal properties and cannot be identical.21 We are surely back to versions of 
A, A’ and A’’, 
 
S)  x (x is a statue & x is a statue). 
 
Which we could render modally as, 
 
S’) x  (x is a statue & x is a statue).  
 
Now clearly it is possible that the marble from which a statue is made should 
not be a statue. We can express this by, 
 
T) x (x is marble & x is a statue). 
 
But how do we get from these anodyne observations concerning the fact that 
falling under the concept of being a statue excludes not falling under the 
concept of being a statue, while falling under the concept of being marble 
does not exclude not falling under the concept of being a statue, to the con- 
clusion that even when it is true that, 
 
U) x (x is a statue & x is made of marble). 
 
It is not true that V? 
 
V) The statue = the marble. 
 
In order to do this we claim that the statue is necessarily a statue while the 
marble is not necessarily a statue, turning relations between concepts into 
talk about objects.  
We saw that Plato’s fallacy depends on moving from a relation of sub- 
ordination, which is claimed to hold between the concepts of having a soul 
and being alive, to the claim that there is an object which instantiates the 
property of necessarily being alive. In the case at hand, we have a situation 
where the relation of subordination does not hold between the concept of 
being a particular lump of marble and that of being a particular statue. Either 
concept might have been instantiated without the other. This is then taken to 
justify us in asserting that we have two different objects, one of which is 
necessarily a statue, and another which is not. Once again, it is the slippage 
from concept to object which leads us into philosophical puzzlement, and 
commits us to the counter-intuitive conclusion that, faced with a marble 
statue alone in a room, one will be making a mistake if one says that there is 




In each of the cases that have been discussed there has been a transition from 
talking about some concept or property, the possession of which is necessary 
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for being a thing of a kind, to talking of an object. So, having a soul is that, 
the possession of which is necessary for being alive. Having a mind is that, 
the possession of which is necessary for being a human. Having the property 
of being self-identical is that, the possession of which is necessary for being 
an object. Having the property of being a statue is that, the possession of 
which is necessary for being a statue. We then speak of that, the possession 
of which is necessary in order to be a thing of a kind (a concept) as though it 
was itself an object. The soul, is necessarily alive. The human, necessarily 
has a mind. The object, is necessarily self-identical. The statue, is necessarily 
a statue. In this way, relations among concepts are turned into facts about the 
existence of things which have certain properties essentially. Subordination 
relations are turned into cases of instantiation. In the Grundgesetze Frege 
introduces a sign, which plays the role of the definite description in natural 
language. It turns an expression for a course of values into an expression 
which refers to the object that falls within the course of values, when there is 
only one such object.22 He does this because he wants to talk not just about 
the course of values of the concept of being able to be put in one:one cor- 
respondence with an N numbered extension, but also about the number one, 
the number two etc. The definite article, an innocent device of natural 
language entices us to talk of souls, minds, objects, and numbers. Natural 
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